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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The issue of whether a buyer's nonreliance on a seller's repre-
sentations effectively removes them from the contract of sale was
sidestepped by the New York Court of Appeals in CBS. Applica-
tion of the UCC as an analogical tool to nongoods sales suggests
that when a buyer acquires reason to disbelieve a seller's represen-
tations in the course of their commercial relationship, the repre-
sentations cannot remain a part of the basis of the bargain. Unless
an express warranty is acknowledged by both parties, one does not
come into existence. To allow otherwise would permit a nonrelying
party to "have its cake and eat it, too. '3 3  _
Svetlana M. Kornfeind
Absent showing of prejudice, indictment and conviction of crimi-
nal defendant by unlicensed prosecutor may stand
The due process clause of the fifth amendment,' and the sixth
amendment right "to be informed of the nature and cause of accu-
sation,"' are vital components of a fair trial.3 If a criminal defend-
ant is convicted, any infringement upon the fairness guaranteed at
trial may warrant reversal unless the evidence of guilt is strong
enough to render the resulting prejudice harmless. 4 However, if the
" See id. at 507, 553 N.E.2d at 1003, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 455 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
' See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id. The
United States Supreme Court has proclaimed that "fair play" is the essence of due process.
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954). Although many jurisdictions have held that the
fifth amendment does not restrict state action, see Pitt v. Pine Valley Golf Club, 695 F.
Supp. 778, 781 (D.N.J. 1988), the Southern District of New York has intimated that the
right to a fair trial exists in the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. See Mishkin v. Thomas, 282 F. Supp. 729, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
' See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation." Id.
I See 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.4(b) (1986 & Supp. 1989). "The essential guarantee of the due
process clause is that the government may not imprison or otherwise physically restrain a
person except in accordance with fair procedures." Id. The defendant's physical liberty is
protected in a number of ways: the fourth amendment requires that an arrest be based on
probable cause; the eighth amendment prohibits excessive bail; the sixth amendment guar-
antees a speedy trial; and the fifth amendment places the burden upon the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
See People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-42, 326 N.E.2d 787, 794, 367 N.Y.S.2d
213, 222, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 38 N.Y.2d 407, 343 N.E.2d 719, 381 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975).
In Crimmins, Judge Jones articulated the nonconstitutional harmless error test:
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violation is of constitutional magnitude,5 the conviction will be re-
versed, regardless of the weight and nature of the proof presented
at trial.6 In New York, the indictment process safeguards the de-
fendant's right to due process by requiring that he be informed of
the charges against him.7 Recently, in People v. Munoz,8 the Ap-
pellate Division, First Department, held that the presentation of a
case by an unlicensed assistant district attorney ("ADA") before a
[E]very error of law (save, perhaps, one of sheerest technicality) is, ipso facto,
deemed to be prejudicial and to require a reversal, unless that error can be found
to have been rendered harmless by the weight and nature of the other proof....
As with the standard, "beyond a reasonable doubt," recourse must ultimately be
to a level of convincement. What is meant here, of course, is that the quantum
and nature of proof, excising the error, are so logically compelling and therefore
forceful in the particular case as to lead the appellate court to the conclusion that
"a jury composed of honest, well-intentioned, and reasonable men and women" on
consideration of such evidence would almost certainly have convicted the
defendant.
Id. However, it is important to note that once the court has convinced itself of the defend-
ant's guilt to this degree, it must further inquire whether, notwithstanding the proof of
guilt, "the error infected or tainted the jury" in any prejudicial manner. Id. at 242, 326
N.E.2d at 794, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 222. But cf. People v. Crimmins, 38 N.Y.2d 407, 425, 343
N.E.2d 719, 732, 381 N.Y.S.2d 1, 13 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (appellate court too
remote to decide whether error affected result).
I See Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d at 237-38, 326 N.E.2d at 790, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 218. The
court applied the constitutional standard of harmless error established by the United States
Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d at
237, 326 N.E.2d at 791, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 217; see also infra note 6 (discussion of Chapman).
6 See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. The Chapman Court held that a prosecutor must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that a federal constitutional error was harmless. Id. In Crim-
mins, the court applied this doctrine, stating that if an appellate court finds that a constitu-
tional error has denied a defendant the right to a fair trial, the conviction must be reversed,
regardless of whether the error materially affected the defendant's conviction. See Crim-
mins, 36 N.Y.2d at 238, 326 N.E.2d at 791, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
Although the Chapman Court declined to hold that federal constitutional errors require
reversal per se, see Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22, the Court did state that "there are some
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error." Id. at 23 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1962) (defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to counsel is basic to fair trial); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
522 (1926) (defendant's right to have Judge free from any conflict of interest is basic to fair
trial)).
7 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("no person shall be held to answer for a capital or other-
wise infamous crime . . . unless on indictment of a grand jury"); People v. lannone, 45
N.Y.2d 589, 593, 384 N.E.2d 656, 659, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113 (1978) (requiring indictment as
essential element of due process). The Iannone court noted that the right to an indictment
by a grand jury is based solely on the New York Constitution because the fifth amendment
grand jury provision is not applicable to the states. See id. at 593 n.3, 384 N.E.2d at 659 n.3,
412 N.Y.S.2d at 113 n.3 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1883)).
1 153 A.D.2d 281, 550 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 922, 554
N.E.2d 78, 555 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1990).
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grand jury and at trial was not sufficiently prejudicial to render the
ensuing indictments" and convictions of two criminal defendants
erroneous per se.1°
In Munoz, the defendants, David Munoz and Elmer Sanchez-
Medina, appealed their convictions of criminal possession and
criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree.1" The
ADA had presented the case before the grand jury and prosecuted
the case before the Supreme Court, New York County.12 Although
the ADA was a law school graduate and had prosecuted cases for
the Kings County District Attorney and the New York Special
Narcotics Prosecutor cumulatively for thirteen years,' 3 he neither
passed the New York State Bar examination, " nor had he ever
been admitted upon waiver pursuant to a reciprocity agreement
with another state.' 5 Despite the defendants' contentions that the
presentation of their case by an unlicensed ADA was harmful error
as a matter of law, rendering their indictments defective per se,16
and their adverse trial determination reversible, the Appellate Di-
vision, First Department, affirmed their convictions.
Writing for the court, Justice Carro acknowledged that an in-
dictment secured by a grand jury without jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter requires a dismissal of the indictment. 8 However, he
concluded that the office of the district attorney had jurisdiction
over the subject matter," and the ADAs, as appointees of the dis-
trict attorney, had similar authority regardless of their qualifica-
tions.20 The court held that the rule requiring per se invalidation
I See id. at 282, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
10 See id.
"' See id. at 281, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 691. The defendants were convicted of selling 3.6
pounds of cocaine to undercover police officers. See id. at 285, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
12 Id. at 283, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 691-92.
" See People v. Lucas, N.Y.L.J., Mar, 14, 1990, at 26, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings County,
Mar. 6, 1990).
14 See Munoz, 153 A.D.2d at 283, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
'5 See id. The office of the district attorney fired the ADA in March of 1989, when it
was revealed that he was not a licensed attorney. See id.
1" Id. at 283, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
17 Id.
See id. at 283, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 692 (citing People v. Dunbar, 53 N.Y.2d 868, 871, 423
N.E.2d 36, 37, 440 N.Y.S.2d 613, 614 (1981)).
See id. at 283, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 693; CPL § 190.25(3)(a) (McKinney 1982).
20 See Munoz, 153 A.D.2d at 283-84, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 693. The court noted that no New
York statute expressly forbids an unlicensed ADA from presenting a case before a grand
jury, and pointed out that New York Judiciary Law section 478 authorizes the practice of
law for certain unlicensed law school graduates. See id; see also N.Y. JuD. LAW § 478 (Mc-
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of an indictment obtained by an unauthorized person did not ap-
ply,21 and absent evidence of prejudice, the indictments should
stand.22 Similarly, in light of the overwhelming proof of the de-
fendants' guilt, the court determined that no reversible error was
committed at trial, and upheld the convictions. 3
It is submitted that current New York law mandates that an
ADA be a licensed attorney before he may be considered an au-
thorized person before the grand jury and therefore, that the
Munoz court erred in not concluding that the indictment was inva-
lid as a matter of law. It is further suggested that prosecution by
an attorney who has not been admitted to the New York State Bar
is prejudicial per se, and that the court should have reversed the
convictions of the Munoz defendants, notwithstanding the evi-
dence of their guilt.
New York Judiciary Law section 460 requires that all persons
practicing law or holding themselves out to the public as having
the authority to practice law be properly examined and licensed.24
Kinney Supp. 1990); infra note 24 (duscussion of § 478).
21 See Munoz, 153 A.D.2d at 284-85, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 693. Criminal Procedure Law
section 210.20(1)(c) states that a court may, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss the in-
dictment if it is within the meaning of CPL section 210.35. CPL § 210.20(1)(c) (McKinney
1982). Section 210.35(5) states that an indictment is defective if it fails to conform with the
requirements of CPL section 190 and prejudices the defendant, thereby threatening the in-
tegrity of the proceedings. See id. § 210.35.
22 See Munoz, 153 A.D.2d at 285, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 693. The court applied the revised
"risk of prejudice" rule. Id. See generally People v. DiFalco, 44 N.Y.2d 482, 487, 377 N.E.2d
732, 736, 406 N.Y.S.2d 279, 283 (1978) (history of "risk of prejudice" rule).
23 See Munoz, 153 A.D.2d at 285, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 693. The court applied the noncon-
stitutional harmless error test. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussion of non-
constitutional harmless error test).
24 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 460 (McKinney Supp. 1990). Section 460 requires that "[a]n
applicant for admission to practice as an attorney or counsellor in this state, must be ex-
amined and licensed to practice as prescribed in this chapter." Id. Section 478 reads, in
pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any natural person to practice or appear as an
attorney-at.law or as an attorney and counselor-at-law [sic] for a person other than himself
in a court of record in this state.., or to hold himself out to the public as being entitled to
practice law as aforesaid, or in any other manner." Id. § 478; see Jemzura v. McCue, 45
A.D.2d 797, 797, 357 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (3d Dep't 1974) (person not licensed to practice as
attorney in New York, or elsewhere, is not qualified to appear as counsel for anyone other
than himself, in any court of this state), appeal dismissed, 37 N.Y.2d 750, 337 N.E.2d 135,
374 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1975).
Three noteworthy exceptions to section 478 allow the practice of law by an unlicensed
attorney. See N.Y. JuD. LAW § 478 (McKinney Supp. 1990). According to section 478, the
restrictions do not apply to: (1) officers of societies for the prevention of cruelty; (2) law
school graduates or law students who have completed two semesters of law school, who have
twice consecutively taken the bar exam, but have not been notified that they have failed the
bar a second time, and who are acting under the supervision of a legal aid organization
1990]
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Thus, a district attorney, a publicly elected officer, whose primary
duty is the prosecution of crimes cognizable by the courts, should
be subject to this licensing requirement.25 It is submitted that an
ADA, who must be able and qualified to "perform the powers and
duties of the office of district attorney" in the event of absence or
under a program approved by the appellate division of their department; and (3) law school
graduates or law students who have completed two semesters of law school, who meet the
bar exam qualifications denoted in (2) and who are acting under the supervision of the state
or a subdivision thereof or of any agency or officer of the state under a program approved by
the appellate division of their department. See id. The Munoz court did not hold that the
ADA was within one of these exceptions, but rather supported its decision with distinguish-
able authority involving an unlicensed attorney who fell clearly within one of the exceptions.
See Munoz, 153 A.D.2d at 283-84, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 693. In holding that the ADA was au-
thorized to appear before the grand jury, the court relied on People v. Garret, Index No.
3689/89 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 14, 1989), for the proposition that an ADA need not be
licensed to be authorized. See id. In Garret, the unlicensed ADA who presented the case to
the grand jury was awaiting admission to the bar, and under New York Judiciary Law sec-
tion 478(3), was not required to be licensed. See Garret, Index No. 3689/89; see also N.Y.
JUD. LAW § 478(3) (McKinney Supp. 1990). The Munoz court also drew support from Peo-
ple v. Dunbar, 53 N.Y.2d 868, 423 N.E.2d 36, 440 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1981). See Munoz, 153
A.D.2d at 283, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 692. In Dunbar, the court held that failure to comply with a
waiver of nonresidence requirement, imposed by the Nassau County Administrative Code,
did not deprive a duly appointed special assistant district attorney of jurisdiction to present
a case before the grand jury. Id. at 870-71, 423 N.E.2d at 37, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 614. However,
in Munoz, it was never alleged that the ADA was licensed to practice in any jurisdiction.
See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. Since the ADA in Dunbar was in fact a
licensed attorney in a jurisdiction other than the one in which he was appointed, it is sug-
gested that the possibility of prejudice in Munoz is much more egregious than that in Dun-
bar. See infra note 33.
In addition, the court in Munoz stated that "no statute expressly forbids the presence
of an unadmitted Assistant District Attorney in the Grand Jury." Munoz, 153 A.D.2d at
284, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 693 (emphasis added). It is suggested, however, that the notion that
the prosecutor who presents the case to the grand jury must be licensed is statutorily
mandated.
2 "The majority of States where there exists no explicit constitutional or statutory pro-
vision requiring that a prosecutor be admitted to practice law hold that admission to the
Bar is a prerequisite to the holding of the office of prosecutor." People v. Jackson, 145 Misc.
2d 1020, 1021, 548 N.Y.S.2d 987, 988 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1989), rev'd on other grounds,
558 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1990); see, e.g., Elliot v. Benefiel, 405 Ill. 500, 503, 91
N.E.2d 427, 428-29 (1950) (implicit in title and duties of state's attorney that he be licensed
to practice law). There is also New York authority which supports this view. See, e.g., In re
Sposato, 180 Misc. 933, 938, 43 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1943) (im-
plicit in New York's statutory and constitutional law is requirement that one be duly admit-
ted attorney in order to seek office of district attorney).
A review of the prosecutor's duties indicates the need for compliance with the licensing
standards. See N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 927 (McKinney 1972). "It shall be the duty of the dis-
trict attorney of the respective counties of New York [and] Bronx ... to prosecute all crimes
and offenses cognizable by the courts of the county for which he shall have been elected or
appointed." Id. The prosecution of felonies necessarily requires that the prosecutor make
presentations to the grand jury. See supra note 7.
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incapability of the district attorney, must also be licensed.26 With-
out proper licensing, an ADA is not a proper person before a grand
jury, and any resulting indictment is void per se.27
A defendant's right to a fair trial requires that any encroach-
ment on the guaranteed indicia of fairness be specially consid-
ered.2 Any potential impropriety is subject to review under the
constitutional harmless error standard, which, at a minimum, re-
quires review of prejudice independent of any evidence regarding
the defendant's guilt.29 It is submitted, therefore, that due to a
prosecutor's role in the judiciary30 and his status as a quasi-judi-
28 New York County Law section 930 gives the district attorney the power to appoint
ADAs. See N.Y. CouN LAW § 930 (McKinney 1972). Although New York County Law
section 702 does not apply directly to the First Department, see id. § 2, section 927, in
describing the duties of the district attorney, states that the district attorney "shall perform
the duties prescribed in section seven hundred," id. § 927. Therefore, reading section 927 to
include section 702, the duties of ADAs in counties of the First Department include all of
"the powers and duties of the office of district attorney." Id. § 702. If the district attorney
must be licensed to properly perform his duties, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying
text, it follows that an ADA must be equally qualified. See .NATIONAL PROSECUTION STAN-
DARDS § 3.1(c) (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 1977) ("[a]ssistant prosecutor shall have com-
pleted an accredited law school and shall be a member of the state bar in good standing").
217 See People v. DiFalco, 44 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 488, 377 N.E.2d 732, 734, 736, 406
N.Y.S.2d 279, 281, 283 (1978). Considering whether an indictment was defective upon a
mere showing of "risk of prejudice" to the defendant, the court held that "the crucial nature
of the prosecutor's role vis-a-vis the Grand Jury, particularly in view of his discretionary
authority, mandates a finding that prejudice to the defendant is likely to result from the
presence of an unauthorized prosecutor before the Grand Jury." Id. at 485, 377 N.E.2d at
734, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 281. "[T]he presence of one unauthorized must, at the very least, be
deemed to create the possibility of prejudice, as a matter of law." Id. at 488, 377 N.E.2d at
736, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
28 See supra notes 1-3, 6 and accompanying text.
21 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
30 See People v. Zimmer, 51 N.Y.2d 390, 393, 414 N.E.2d 705, 707, 434 N.Y.S.2d 206,
207 (1980). Writing for the court in Zimmer, Judge Fuchsberg reasoned that "a District
Attorney carries [a] ... sensitive burden [in that] he must never lose sight of the fact that a
defendant, as an integral member of the body politic, is entitled to a full measure of fair-
ness." Id. (citations omitted).
Despite subsequent reversal by the Appellate Division, Second Department, Judge
Beldock, in People v. Jackson, enumerated a list of persuasive factors to support the view
that a conviction should be reversed per se where the prosecutor is unlicensed. See People v.
Jackson, 145 Misc. 2d 1020, 1029-31, 548 N.Y.S.2d 987, 993-94 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1989), rev'd, 558 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1990). This list included the fact that: (1)
a prosecutor may have more control over an individual's freedom than any other public
official; (2) a fraud is committed on the court by the unlicensed practitioner; (3) an unli-
censed practitioner is not an officer of the court and is not bound to the ethical standards of
an officer of the court; and (4) "[a]s the late Justice Brandeis stated in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485,. . . 'If the Government becomes a lawbreaker ... it invites anar-
chy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means ...
would bring terrible retribution." Id.; see United States v. Ott, 489 F.2d 872, 874 (7th Cir.
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cial' county officer,3 2 his conduct at trial necessarily implicates
fairness. Furthermore, given the inherent discretion in the role of a
prosecutor, and the varying level of judicial supervision, it is sug-
gested that prosecution by an unlicensed attorney impairs the in-
tegrity of the proceeding and cannot be considered harmless.33
Consequently, by applying the constitutional harmless error stan-
dard, it appears that the Munoz convictions should be reversed as
a matter of law.
Although a finding of harmful error will not always "result in
fatal consequences to the People,"34 courts are often hesitant to
reverse a manifestly fair conviction.3 5 Following Munoz, the deci-
sion by the New York Supreme Court, Kings County, in People v.
Lucas,36 illustrates the judicial hesitancy to reverse a conviction,
1973) ("deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct by a participant in a proceeding before a
tribunal . . . is inconsistent with fair administration of justice"); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-1, 3-3, 7-13 (1989) (public prosecutors held to higher standard
of ethical conduct than other advocates). "Where the prosecutor is recreant to the trust
implicit in his office, he undermines the confidence, not only in his profession, but in gov-
ernment and the very ideal of justice itself." PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE
JOINT CONFERENCE, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958).
" See People v. Kyser, 52 A.D.2d 1072, 1072, 384 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334 (4th Dep't 1976).
3 See Fisher v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 60, 61, 176 N.E.2d 72, 73, 217 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1961).
33 The court in Munoz applied the nonconstitutional harmless error test and stated
that "in a closer case, we might have been inclined to reverse, [but] any error here was
harmless, in light of the overwhelming proof of guilt." See Munoz, 153 A.D.2d at 285, 550
N.YS.2d at 693. Some commentators have distinguished between evidentiary errors, which
are analyzed under the harmless error test, and errors that result from violations that re-
move the substantive protection of a right, which automatically require a new trial. See W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6, at 996 (1985); Survey, Appellate Division
Holds Defendant Not Entitled to Conviction Reversal Although Denied His Right To
Counsel at Suppression Hearing, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 645, 649-50 n.24 (1989).
3' See People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241, 326 N.E.2d 787, 793, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213,
221 (1975). The Crimmins court weighed the consequences to the people against any
prejudice to the defendant and concluded that reversal "does not result in fatal conse-
quences to the People; they are put to a new trial, but the defendant does not go free." Id.
" Although the cost of a new trial and the burden on the people should not limit the
defendant's right to a fair trial, they are factors that cannot be ignored. Also, the unavaila-
bility of witnesses and the possible memory lapses of those available may force a prosecutor
to dismiss the charges against the defendant. See Survey, Criminal Defendant is Per Se
Entitled to Vacatur of His Conviction When Represented by an Attorney Whose License is
Subsequently Revoked, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 162, 168 n.27 (1988) (citing Solina v. United
States, 709 F.2d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 1983)). "Reversal is an ill-suited remedy for prosecutorial
misconduct; it does not affect the prosecutor directly, but rather imposes upon society the
cost of retrying an individual who was fairly convicted." People v. Roopchand, 107 A.D.2d
35, 36, 485 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (2d Dep't), afl'd, 65 N.Y.2d 837, 482 N.E.2d 924, 493 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1985) (citations omitted).
36 See N.Y.L.J., Mar. 14, 1990, at 26, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Mar. 6, 1990).
1990] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
even upon a finding of prejudicial error.37 In Lucas, the court ana-
lyzed the "fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecu-
tor"-a standard less protective of the defendant's rights than the
constitutional harmless error test." Thus, it is suggested that
where the integrity of the prosecution has been called into ques-
tion, the prosecution should bear the burden of proving an absence
of prejudice, and the defendant should be protected by the stan-
dard most protective of his rights-the constitutional harmless
error standard.39
John R. Marcil
Appellate Division recognizes preconception tort liability in favor
of DES granddaughter
American courts uniformly recognize a child's right to sue for
injuries sustained prior to birth,1 yet only a minority of jurisdic-
tions have been willing to extend prenatal tort liability2 to include
37 Id.
11 Id. at 27, col. 1. The court adopted the rationale in Munoz, see supra note 23 and
accompanying text, regarding the application of the nonconstitutional harmless error test.
Id. "In order to prevail on a post-trial motion to set aside a verdict a defendant must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence some error or misconduct, and that the claimed error or
misconduct created a substantial risk of prejudice." Id.; see People v. Rhodes, 92 A.D.2d
744, 745, 461 N.Y.S.2d 81, 83 (4th Dep't 1983).
39 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. It is submitted that an unlicensed attor-
ney deceives the court, the defendant, and the public. If the implicit trust given to the office
of the district attorney is assured by proper qualifications, licensing and oaths, an individual
who fails to provide such assurances should not benefit from a presumption that no unfair-
ness occurred. At a minimum, the burden should be on the people to show that prosecution
by an unlicensed attorney did not prejudice the defendant. Justice should be the ultimate
goal; it may be assured by a retrial, or merely approximated by upholding a conviction.
See Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability For Injuries to the
Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DuKE L.J.
1401, 1402. American jurisdictions achieved unanimity in recognizing prenatal tort actions
when the Alabama Supreme Court decided Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So.2d 596
(1972). Robertson, supra. In Huskey, the court recognized and overruled Alabama's position
as the only remaining state denying recovery for prenatal tort injuries. See Huskey, 289 Ala.
at 54, 265 So. 2d at 597-98.
2 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 55,
at 367 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. The area of prenatal injuries can be
